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We extend covert communication to the quantum regime by showing that covert quantum com-
munication is possible over optical channels with noise arising either from the environment or from
the sender’s lab. In particular, we show that sequences of qubits can be transmitted covertly by
using both a single photon and a coherent state encoding. We study the possibility of performing
covert quantum key distribution and show that positive key rates and covertness can be achieved si-
multaneously. Covert communication requires a secret key between sender and receiver, which raises
the problem of how this key can be regenerated covertly. We show that covert QKD consumes more
key than it can generate and propose instead a hybrid protocol for covert key regeneration that uses
pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) together with covert QKD to regenerate secret keys.
The security of the new key is guaranteed by QKD while the security of the covert communication
is at least as strong as the security of the PRNG.
Alice wants to plan a surprise birthday party for Eve,
but this is challenging given Eve’s notorious eavesdrop-
ping skills. Encrypting the invitations she sends to Bob,
Charlie, and the other guests may prevent Eve from
knowing the content of the messages, but this is not
enough: the fact alone that Alice is communicating with
her friends will make Eve suspicious, foiling any hopes of
a surprise. What Alice needs is a method of communi-
cation that is undetectable by Eve: a method for covert
communication.
As with other cryptographic tasks, techniques for
covert communication date back to ancient times, where
messages were hidden in seemingly innocuous objects
such as the scalp of travellers, whose hair would be shaved
to reveal a hidden message. Modern techniques include
classical and quantum steganography [1–3] and frequency
hopping in spread-spectrum radio transmissions [4]. Re-
cently, several schemes have been proposed where covert
classical communication is achieved by hiding informa-
tion in the noise of optical channels [5–8]. In particular,
in Ref. [9], Bash et al. showed that it is possible to
covertly transmit classical information over lossy bosonic
channels with thermal noise, even in the presence of a
quantum adversary.
In this work, we extend covert communication to the
quantum regime by introducing practical protocols to
covertly transmit quantum information, using both sin-
gle photon and coherent state signals. We show that se-
quences of qubits can be transmitted covertly in the pres-
ence of noise originating from the environment or from
the sender’s lab, giving analytical security bounds for
both cases. In the model where noise originates from the
lab, security can be obtained even when Eve is given full
control of the channel connecting Alice and Bob. This is
an improvement with respect to previous work where Eve
could not alter the channel parameters. We then study
covert quantum key distribution and show that positive
key rates and covertness can be achieved simultaneously.
All methods for covert communication require that the
parties share a random secret key. This is an important
difficulty, as the participants must ensure that they are
not detected when they do so and, once they consume
the key, they must find ways of covertly regenerating a
new one. This is the key regeneration problem in covert
communication, which unfortunately has not been pre-
viously addressed in the literature. In this work, we
first show that covert QKD protocols using sequences of
qubits consume more secret key than they produce. We
then propose a hybrid approach to key regeneration in
which pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) and
covert QKD can be combined to regenerate secret keys.
The security of the key is guaranteed by QKD while the
security of covert communication can be shown to be at
least as strong as the security of the PRNG.
Covert qubits.— Alice wants to transmit a sequence
of qubits to Bob in such a way that Eve cannot detect
that they are communicating. We assume that Alice is
equally likely to communicate or not, and Eve’s goal is to
correctly distinguish between these two scenarios. Eve’s
detection error probability Pe is given by Pe =
1
2 (PFA +
PMD), where PFA is the probability of a false alarm and
PMD is the probability of a missed detection. Alice and
Bob’s goal is to prevent Eve from performing better than
a random guess, i.e. they want that Pe ≥ 12 −  for
sufficiently small  > 0. We refer to  as the detection
bias.
We consider the case when Alice encodes a qubit state
in a single photon across two optical modes. For definite-
ness, we assume that they correspond to the polarization
degree of freedom of a single time-bin mode, but this
specification is not required for our results. We further
assume that they have access to N such time-bins, each
of which may be used to send a qubit signal. Then our
protocol for covert quantum communication is simple:
For each of the N time-bins, Alice sends a qubit signal
with probability q  1, and with probability 1 − q, she
does nothing. The only thing that changes compared to
a regular protocol is that signals are not sent sequen-
tially, but randomly spread out in time. This is an ad-
vantage compared to previously proposed protocols for
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2FIG. 1: Two noise models for covert communication. In case
(A), Alice and Bob are connected by a lossy bosonic channel
with therml noise, which is modelled as a beam-splitter with
transmissivity η, where the input from the environment is a
thermal state ρn¯ with mean photon number n¯. In case (B),
the therml noise comes from Alice’s lab. In both cases, Eve
has no control over the parameters inside the red boxes.
covert classical communication which are more involved
[9]. Alice sends on average Nq qubit signals on time-
bins that are pre-agreed according to the secret key. For
Eve, who doesn’t have the key, Alice sends a signal with
probability q for each time-bin.
For our first noise model, we assume that Alice and
Bob are connected by a lossy bosonic channel with ther-
mal noise. This is modelled as a beam splitter with trans-
missivity η, where the input from the environment is a
thermal state ρn¯ with mean photon number n¯, as illus-
trated in Fig. 1 (A). As in previous work on covert com-
munication [5–9], we assume that Eve has access to all
the photons that do not reach Bob, but cannot otherwise
change the channel parameters.
This kind of noise model puts strong constraints on
Eve’s power, which is not the standard for quantum com-
munication, where Eve is given full control over the chan-
nel. To address this issue, we also consider a model where
the noise originates from Alice’s lab – which is inacces-
sible to Eve – but give Eve full control over the channel
connecting Alice and Bob. This model is also illustrated
in Fig. 1 (B).
For either of the two models, to prove that our protocol
is secure, we only need to show that Eve cannot reliably
distinguish the 2N -mode state ρ that she receives when
Alice and Bob do not communicate from the state σ she
receives when they do communicate. The minimum er-
ror probability of distinguishing these two states can be
bounded as [10]
Pe ≥ 1
2
− 1
4
||ρ− σ|| ≥ 1
2
−
√
1
8
D(ρ||σ), (1)
where D(ρ||σ) = Tr (ρ log ρ) − Tr (ρ log σ) is the relative
entropy.
If Alice and Bob do not communicate, the input to the
channel is the vacuum state for each polarization mode,
and Eve’s state is a thermal state. Therefore, Eve’s two-
mode state ρE is
ρE = ρn¯′ ⊗ ρn¯′ , (2)
where n¯′ = ηn¯ in the first model and n¯′ = (1−η)n¯ in the
second model. On the other hand, when Alice and Bob
communicate, Eve’s two-mode state is
σE = (1− q)ρE + qρs (3)
where, as before, ρE is Eve’s state when there is no signal
and ρs is her state when Alice sends a qubit signal, which
can be calculated for both of our models (see Supple-
mentary Material). Since Alice and Bob independently
choose whether to send a signal or not for each time-bin,
Eve’s 2N -mode states ρ and σ are tensor product states
of the form ρ = (ρE)
⊗N
, σ = (σE)
⊗N
.
From Eq. (1), the detection bias  can be bounded in
terms of the relative entropy between these states as
 ≤
√
1
8
D(ρ||σ) =
√
N
8
D(ρE ||σE),
where we have used the fact that the relative entropy is
additive for tensor product states.
In general, Alice may send different qubit states in her
signals, each of which would lead to a different state for
Eve. In such cases, we can bound the detection bias by
considering only the worst case among all signal states
 ≤ max
i
√
N
8
D(ρE ||σE,i) (4)
where σE,i is Eve’s state when Alice sends the i-th state.
Thus, from now on we simply assume that σE corre-
sponds to the worst-case signal.
For given values of the parameters N, n¯, η, and q, we
can use Eq. (4) to bound  and quantify the security of
the protocol. However, we are also interested in analyt-
ical bounds that showcase the role of these parameters
explicitly. We assume that Alice and Bob want to send
an average of d qubit signals, which fixes N and q to
satisfy Nq = d. For both of our models, we can upper
bound the relative entropy through a Taylor series ex-
pansion, keeping only terms to second order in q. We
then introduce an additional bound over values of the
transmissivity η, which notably leads to the same bound
for both our models (See Supplemental Material). The
resulting bound on the detection bias is
 ≤
√
dn¯2
8(1 + n¯)3
+
1 + 4n¯+ 5n¯2 + 3n¯3
16n¯(1 + n¯)3
d2
N
. (5)
In the regime where n¯ 1 and q > n¯2, we can approxi-
mate this bound as
 . d
4
√
1
n¯N
, (6)
3which gives us a 1√
N
scaling of the detection bias as a
function of the number of time-bins N in this regime.
From this expression we can also deduce a 1√
N
scaling for
the number of covert qubits d that can be transmitted for
fixed . Furthermore, the mean photon number n¯ places a
limit to how small the detection bias can be, since the up-
per bound can never be smaller than
√
dn¯2
8(1+n¯)3 ≈
√
d
8 n¯.
Covert communication with coherent states.— Al-
though the polarization of a single photon defines a qubit,
in practical implementations, it is usually more conve-
nient to use coherent states. Instead of a single-photon
qubit state |ψ〉 = λ1|1〉H + λ2|1〉V , where |1〉H and |1〉V
correspond to a single photon in the horizontal and verti-
cal polarization modes respectively, we employ the state
|α,ψ〉 = |αλ1〉H ⊗ |αλ2〉V , (7)
where |α|2 = µ is the total mean photon number [11].
Notice that in this case we have a product state of both
polarization modes.
We require that the average number of photons re-
ceived by Bob when using coherent states is the same as
in the single photon case. This means that if q is the
probability of selecting a time-bin in the single photon
case and q′ is the corresponding probability in the coher-
ent state case, we must have q = µq′.
As before, we define σE to be Eve’s state when Alice
and Bob send a worst-case signal, which can be straight-
forwardly computed (see Supplemental Material). We
can bound the detection bias as in Eq. (4), with a fur-
ther bound on the relative entropy by using a Taylor
series expansion to second order in q and µ, while also
bounding over values of η (see Supplemental Material).
This leads to the expression
 ≤
[(
n¯2(1 + 2n¯)
µ(1 + n¯)4
+
n¯
(1 + n¯)2
+
n¯µ
3(1 + n¯)2
)
d
8
+
(
n¯(1 + 2n¯) + 2n¯
2µ2(1 + n¯)4
+
1 + 7n¯+ 16n¯2 + 12n¯3
2n¯(1 + n¯)3
)
d2
8N
] 1
2
.
For n¯  1 and µ  1 with µ  n¯, we can approximate
this bound as
 .
√
d2
16Nn¯
+
dn¯
8
, (8)
which also gives us a 1√
N
scaling for the detection bias.
Figure 2 illustrates the behaviour of the detection bias
when Alice and Bob use single-photon and coherent-
state signals in the model where noise comes from Alice’s
lab. The square-root scaling of the detection bias can be
clearly seen in both cases for a certain range of values of
N . Overall, both implementations behave similarly and
for the values considered, can achieve a detection bias
below 2%.
Covert QKD.— Based on these results, we study the
possibility of performing covert quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD). Two issues must be addressed. First, the
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FIG. 2: Log-log plot of the upper bound of Eq. (4) as a func-
tion of the number of time-bins N . We consider the model
where noise comes from Alice’s lab. The black curve cor-
responds to the single photon protocol and the dashed red
curve to the coherent state protocol. Both curves overlap al-
most perfectly. We have set d = 20, η = 0.5, and n¯ = 10−5,
as would be the case for a thermal state at temperature 300K
and infrared wavelength of 4.2µm. The mean photon number
used in the coherent state case is µ = 10−3.
possibility of keeping the classical post-processing covert,
which can be carried out using existing protocols for
covert classical communication [9]. Most QKD protocols
require two-way classical communication, which can be
achieved in our first model since the situation is symmet-
ric for both Alice and Bob, while for the second model,
it requires Bob to also have a source of noise in his lab.
Second, we need to prove that Bob can actually use the
weak signals sent by Alice. To do this, we show that, on
the channel with parameters that guarantee low detection
bias , Alice and Bob would have positive key rate even
if all the errors were attributed to Eve. For definiteness,
we focus on the BB84 protocol with both a single photon
and coherent state implementation. The asymptotic key
rates, with optimal error-correction, are respectively [12]
KS = R(1− 2h(Q)) (9)
KC = R[Y1(1− h(Q/Y1))− h(Q)] (10)
where h(·) is the binary entropy, R is the total detection
rate, Q is the quantum bit error rate, Y1 = max(0, 1− µ2τ ),
and τ is the total transmissivity. In general, Eve has con-
trol over the error rate so she can always prevent Alice
and Bob from establishing a key. What we need to show
is that they can achieve positive key rates despite the
presence of the noise that is required for covert commu-
nication. This will occur if the resulting error rates Q,
arising solely from the noise, are sufficiently low.
In the model where noise comes from the lab and in the
absence of additional experimental imperfections, the er-
ror rates due to noise in the single photon and coherent
state case respectively satisfy (see Supplemental Mate-
4rial)
QS ≈
(
1
η
− 1
)
n¯, QC ≈
(
1
η
− 1
)
n¯
µ
. (11)
In the single photon case, the key rate of Eq. (9) is pos-
itive as long as QS < 0.11, which can be easily achieved
whenever n¯  1. Similarly, in the coherent state case,
positive key rates can be obtained if µ ≤ τ and QC  1,
which occurs whenever n¯  µ. Thus, we can have pos-
itive key rates for covert QKD even in the presence of
noise. In order to also achieve a small detection bias, we
must simply set a sufficiently large number of time-bins
N . From Eqs. (6) and (8), this requires setting N  d2n¯
in both the single photon and the coherent state case.
For the values used in Fig. 2, which are n¯ = 10−5,
µ = 10−3, and η = 0.5, we can obtain key rates of
KS = 0.99R, and KC = 0.47R for transmissivity t = µ,
while still achieving a detection bias smaller than 2%
for N ∼ 1010 time-bins. This shows that it is possible
to simultaneously achieve non-zero key rates and a low
detection bias in covert QKD. For other quantum com-
munication protocols, it should also suffice to set n¯  1
in the single photon case and n¯ µ in the coherent state
case, since these conditions imply a large signal to noise
ratio for the receiver.
As we argue in the next section, an application of
covert QKD is that it allows Alice and Bob to regenerate
the secret strings that are required for covert communi-
cation.
Secret key regeneration.— Ideally, we would like to
run a covert QKD protocol that generates more secret
key than it consumes. However, this is not possible to
achieve with QKD protocols that use a sequence of qubits
as signals. In a covert QKD protocol, Alice indepen-
dently sends a signal with probability q for each of the
N available time-bins. In the limit of large N , the aver-
age amount of shared bits needed to specify the selected
time-bins is N h(q), where h(·) is the binary entropy. On
the other hand, at best, Alice and Bob only obtain an av-
erage of d = Nq secret bits from running the covert QKD
protocol, without including the overhead required by pa-
rameter estimation and error-correction. Since h(q) > q
for q < 12 , it follows necessarily that such a protocol for
covert QKD consumes more key than it can produce. We
are thus forced to look for alternatives. We propose in-
stead a hybrid key regeneration method, where Alice and
Bob obtain computational security for the covert com-
munication by using pseudorandom number generators
(PRNGs) to decide for which time-bins they send their
signals, while retaining information-theoretic security of
the regenerated secret key.
PRNGs take a truly random key as input and expand it
into an exponentially larger pseudorandom output. The
PRNG is secure if this output cannot be distinguished
from a truly random string. Since the pseudorandom
output is much larger than the seed, it can now be used
to perform large amounts of covert QKD, thus generat-
ing a new secret key larger than the original key that
was used as input, allowing an indefinite amount of key
regeneration [13]. The security of the QKD protocol is
unchanged during covert communication, so the new key
will have information-theoretic security. On the other
hand, the security of the covert communication can be
shown to be at least as strong as the security of the un-
derlying PRNG.
To see this, assume that Eve can break the security of
the covert communication protocol implemented with a
PRNG output, but she can’t if it is implemented with a
truly random string. Then Eve has the power to break
the security of the PRNG too. Indeed, provided with the
alleged random string, she could simply run the covert
communication protocol herself: if she can’t break its
security, the string must be truly random and if she can,
the string must be pseudorandom. By contrapositive,
this implies that if Eve cannot break the security of the
PRNG, in particular she cannot break the security of a
covert communication protocol that uses a PRNG output
instead of true randomness. Thus, the security of covert
communication is at least as strong as the security of the
PRNG.
Discussion.— We have given simple methods to per-
form covert quantum communication over noisy optical
channels. In the case of QKD, we have shown that small
detection biases and positive key rates can be obtained
simultaneously. For implementations, it will be crucial
to choose optimal wavelengths that lead to significant
noise that is still low enough for Bob to reliably detect
the signals. We note that in principle any type of optical
noise can be used, not just thermal noise. It will also be
important to determine the conditions under which the
large running times required for covert QKD will be man-
ageable in a practical setting. Although in this work we
have focused on QKD, it will be interesting to apply our
techniques for covert quantum communication to other
protocols.
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